Born in 1968, he was seized with his younger cousin, Hezbullah (ISN 666, see above), and in his assessment on October 21, 2003 it was stated that US and Afghan soldiers had searched his house and his village “because of his relationship to his first cousin, a senor Taliban leader and the Taliban’s former Eighth Division Commander,” identified as Saifullah Rahman Mansour. It was “also determined that [he] had brothers that were members of the Taliban government,’ albeit ones who were not named and were described as being of “undetermined seniority.”

Questioned and “suspected of then continued involvement [sic] with the Taliban,” he was taken into custody with Hezbullah, undergoing the process his cousin described: preliminary detention in Gardez, followed by 40 days in Bagram, and approximately a month in Kandahar. Despite attempting to ramp up his significance, however, the Task Force’s spurious reason for his transfer to Guantánamo on June 14, 2002 was ambivalent, noting only that he had been transferred “because of his possible knowledge concerning senior Taliban members.”

In its reasons for detaining Andarr, the Task Force stated that Mansour was “reported to be directing hit-and-run attacks on US and Coalition forces in AF, as well as reportedly planning suicide-bombing attacks against senior Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) members.” It was alleged that Andarr was captured at a compound controlled by Mansour (although his cousin’s account suggested that he had voluntarily taken US forces to the compound) “and was living [sic] and working for Mansour,” and although it was assessed that much of the information he was presumed to possess was “considered dated and would be of marginal use, that information he could still possess might lead to a greater understanding of the persons involved in insurgent operations.” It was also noted that information about is brothers might also be useful, as “his family’s affiliations pose a continuing threat to the ATA.”

In his assessment, it was noted that he was “assessed as being a low-level Taliban member,” who was “of low intelligence value to the United States,” and was “a low threat risk to the US, its interests and allies.” As a result, Maj. Gen. Miller recommended that he be “considered for transfer to the control of another government for continued detention.”